



Washington's Arab Puppets: Their Sound And Fury Signify Nothing

This transcript may not be 100% accurate due to audio quality or other factors.

Dimitri Lascaris (DL): Good morning, this is Dimitri Lascaris coming to you from Kalamata, Greece, on September 11th, 2025. Today we're going to focus on Israel's attack on Qatar and the danger of the resumption of hostilities between Iran and Israel. To discuss these matters, we're pleased to be joined today for the first time by Dr. Foad Izadi. Dr. Izadi is an Associate Professor at the Department of American Studies, Faculty of War Studies, University of Tehran, where he teaches MA and PhD courses in American Studies. His research and teaching interests are interdisciplinary and focus on United States-Iran relations and US public diplomacy. Thank you very much for joining us today, Dr. Izadi.

Dr. Foad Izadi (FI): Thank you. Thank you for having me.

DL: So I would like to start our discussion today with some questions relating to the Israeli attack on Qatar on Tuesday of this week. The Western-backed Arab regimes have reacted, at least rhetorically, harshly to this attack. The Qatari regime itself described the attack as state terrorism and vowed retaliation. The Saudi regime condemned the attack in the strongest possible terms and offered to Qatar all of its capabilities to respond to the attack, raising the potential implication that it would be even prepared to provide military support to some kind of physical retaliation to Israel's aggression. Now, until now, Western-backed Arab regimes, I think most objective observers would agree, have done almost nothing to restrain Israel's aggression. Do you think that the Arab autocracies are finally prepared to take real action to deter Israeli aggression or do you expect that their statements will turn out to be essentially theatre?

FI: I don't think they're going to do anything serious. I think what they have done in the last two years is actually they have aided Israel in the genocide that Israel is conducting in Gaza. We have people from the UAE going into Gaza as physicians or nurses and they spy on behalf of Israel. UAE has established formal diplomatic relations and they hosted the Israeli president a few months ago officially. We have some Christian Zionists, we have some

Jewish Zionists and we have Muslim Zionists. And the people who are running the UAE are Muslim Zionist. They not only don't mind the genocide and the killings, that they are so much dependent on the United States and Western powers that they are willing to do anything for Israel. And this is what they have done. The Saudi government is more or less in the same situation. They have had relations with Israelis since the 1960s. They have not officially announced the normalisation of relations with Israel, but they have been working with Israelis. We have dozens of Israeli firms that are working in Saudi Arabia, extensive economic relationships, and intelligence sharing. You know, when Israel is bombing Yemen and they have done that more often in recent weeks, including yesterday, they do that with the help of the Saudi government.

So if anyone is expecting this puppet government to do anything serious, they are not going to do it. They are fully in line with the dictates that come from Washington. It was Qatar that said that they are going to invest a billion dollars in the United States. They are providing a plane to President Trump. And they cannot even have Israelis keep the promise that they had; Israelis had told the Qataris that they would not target Hamas. And so they violated that. So we are in a miserable situation in this part of the world because some of the rulers are not interested in their national interests. They are letting the Western powers plunder their resources as long as they are kept in power. They are willing to do anything. Unfortunately.

DL: So that view that you've just expressed, which is one that many of our guests have expressed in one form or another over the years with complete justification, raises the question, to whom are these autocrats, addressing their rhetoric? I think the most obvious possibility is it's to their own constituents because they are trying to persuade ordinary citizens in their own countries that they are actually serious about defending the honour of the Arab peoples and the dignity of the Palestinians and international law and all the rest of it. Or perhaps they're addressing themselves to Western audiences to convey the impression, you know, that they are in fact sovereign and independent leaders of their own countries. What do you think they're trying to accomplish with this kind of rhetoric? And if you think that they're trying to really sort of calm the waters in their own countries, how much of a risk do you think there is now? And this is really, I think, the main question I want to put to you: In light of the extent and nature of Israel's aggressions now attacking a Gulf autocracy, how much risk do you think there is of real political instability within these countries, the kind of political instability that might actually threaten their rule?

FI: I don't think they're in serious danger now because they have crushed the opposition with Israeli help. You know, one reason they're dependent on Israel is because they're using Israeli technology, spy technology to basically suppress any sort of opposition because of the wealth that they have. They have bribed potential opposition figures. So it's a combination of carrots and sticks. And they have been more or less successful with the help of Israel and the United States to secure their rule. These are monarchies, so they don't have elections. They don't have any level of political freedom. The monarch decides to do whatever the monarch decides to do. And people have to follow. And if they don't, remember what happened to this journalist, Khashoggi, the Saudis used a chainsaw to kill him. And the Saudi consulate a few

years ago, you remember that?

DL: Yes. The Washington Post...

FI: So this is the type of regime we are dealing with. So they're not worried about instability in that sense. That is the bad news. The good news is that the number of ordinary citizens is much larger than the monarchs. And when people are humiliated the way they have been sooner or later, and I think later, more later than sooner, these people realise that there is no benefit – if you have all this wealth, you should use this wealth for the well-being of your country, maybe help others internationally instead of letting a ruling family plunder these resources and give it away to Western powers. And a lot of people realise that. So as this genocide continues and people see the pictures on their television, and they realise that their governments not only are not doing anything to stop the genocide, they're actually aiding the Israelis, I think you will see a situation later on, not in the near future, that people will realise that maybe they need to get rid of these monarchs. Maybe it's time for democracy in these countries. It's going to be a difficult task because Qatar hosts about 10,000 American soldiers at that American base. UAE, all these other countries are more or less occupied by the United States. And it doesn't look like an occupied country because things look normal, but they are really occupied by the United States. And when a country is occupied by foreign power, and when that foreign power is the United States, it's not easy to get rid of that foreign power.

DL: That's especially the United States. I want to talk to you a little bit about this controversy that is swirling in the Arab world about exactly what the Qatari regime knew at the relevant time. There was a report that emerged almost immediately after the attack. I believe it was in the Times of Israel, probably in other Israeli media that the Trump administration had both green-lighted the attack and had advised the Qatari regime in advance of the attack that the attack would occur. And the Qataris then denied this vociferously and said, well, we did receive what they called a notification – they didn't call it a warning – but the notification we received from the US of the Israeli attack was delivered to us after the explosions had begun. Which is rather curious, because what utility would that notification have had for the Qatari if they were told as the attack was under progress? And of course, there's also the factor that there doesn't appear to have been any activation at all of the Qatari air defences. No apparent attempt was made to shoot down these missiles or the warplanes that delivered them. And this morning or yesterday, in Haaretz, the Israeli liberal newspaper, a columnist by the name of Hagai Amit actually argued that it was likely that the Qataris not only knew in advance of the attack, but they allowed it to happen. And Amit's argument in part is, you know, you mentioned this \$1 trillion investment that the Qatari have vowed to make in the United States. And of course, there's this massive military base a few dozen kilometres from Doha and so forth, his argument is that the United States government would not want to risk its relationship with Qatar by allowing this attack and quite possibly facilitating this attack without their approval. Now, I realise I'm asking you to opine on something with respect to which we have limited information, but what is your sense? Do you think it's likely that the Qataris actually had knowledge that this attack was going to occur before it began and that they allowed it to happen?

FI: You know, I think this was a joint American-Israeli operation. I think we can be sure about that 100%. These planes use the Jordanian airspace, Saudi airspace that needed coordination, that needed the US pushing these countries to allow the Israeli airplanes to reach Qatar. Without US coordination, I don't think that would have been possible. Then these planes needed refuelling because, you know, the F-35s, the best version of the F-35s, can have a plane fly for about 2,100 kilometres. And the distance from occupied Palestine and Qatar, it's much longer; so maybe about 1,000 kilometres short of what they need in terms of fuel to go to Qatar and go back. So on their way back, they needed refuelling. We have some reports that British refueling planes that were based in Qatar were used to do the refueling for these planes to go back. And given the American base there, these things cannot happen without not only knowledge, but coordination of the United States. That much we are certain. How much the Qatari government knew, I think if we want to guess, because as you said, we don't have all the information, is that they had, I think they had prior warning in order to let them know that this is what the Israelis want to do, and we have given them a blank check, and so we are going to do this. They have told the Qataris that this is going to happen, and you just have to live with that decision. And they didn't get the people that they wanted. So there was a problem there. So whether this was managed by Qatar, given the fact that they had prior knowledge, that they had other Hamas people, not the top leadership at the place that was hit, generally Israelis are good at hitting the people that they want. So when they miss in this manner, it shows that something went wrong, and it could be the Qataris that decided, they don't want that top leadership to be killed, and this is what they did because they had prior knowledge; these are things that will come out sooner or later. But I think the first part of what I said is 100 %, the other ones we have to wait and see.

DL: I want to talk to you a little bit about the reaction of the European Union to this attack on Doha by the Israelis and compare it to the reaction of the EU when Israel killed Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran last year. At that point, the EU refused to condemn Israel, and on the contrary, in its statement, it seemed to suggest that the Israeli attack was justified as retaliation and as self-defence. But this time, when Israel struck Qatar, the EU condemned Israel's attack as a violation of international law. It used no such language to describe Israel's attack on Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. What do you think accounts for this differential response to these two attacks?

FI: You know, Qatar is on their team. The problem they have is that Israel is also on their team. So they had to provide a more balanced statement given the fact that Qatar invested a lot in Western governments, in Western countries. They use PR firms extensively in these Western governments. So the level of soft power is greater. And Qatar, I don't know if you have attended this or not, they have this Doha forum, Doha dialogue that they do almost every year. And they invite all these Western politicians and think tanks. So it's a feast. You know, they use the Sheraton Hotel. They pay for the trips. So these Western governments, officials, think tank experts, media personalities, have benefited personally from the Qatari budget. And because of that, you see a different type of treatment when it comes to Qatar. But it doesn't change the main calculus. The main calculus is that Israel can hit any place in this part of the world as they wish. They can kill more than 60,000 people in Gaza. They can

starve people. They can engage in a genocide. And people have only one choice, watch. Just watch the genocide live on their television. That is not going to change.

DL: So, Dr. Izadi, I'd like to switch now and talk to you about the Iranian government's dealings with the International Atomic Energy Association. On Tuesday of this week, the IAEA and Iran announced that they had reached a deal on resuming inspections at Iranian nuclear sites, including those bombed by the United States illegally in June of this year. And I myself was somewhat surprised about this development because given the Iranian government's distrust of the IAEA and its apparent suspicion that the IAEA passed information to Israel about Iran's nuclear programme and its nuclear scientists, given also that the the IAEA issued a decision, I believe it was the day before Israel began its attacks on Iran in June, which Israel effectively exploited for propaganda purposes in an attempt to try to justify its attacks, I would have thought that given all of this that the Iranian government would not be inclined to allow IAEA inspectors to return to the country. And I'm curious to have your thoughts as to why you believe the government of Iran has decided now to effectively trust the IAEA.

FI: I think there are two reasons. One reason, as you know, we have a reformist government in place in the executive branch. Dr. Pezeshkian was a reformist candidate. He campaigned on dialogue with the West. He said that he's going to resume negotiations with the United States. Dr. Araghchi is a reformist foreign minister. And this is the political background that they come from. So negotiating with the West or IAEA or these guys, these type of guys, is something they don't mind at all because of that philosophy that they have. But if you ask Dr. Araghchi, why did you do that? This is what he will tell you: He will tell that, look, we have in just a couple of weeks this snap-back mechanism that means these UN sanctions that were suspended because of the nuclear agreement will come back – you know, in JCPOA, the nuclear agreement, they had this Article 36, 37 that would allow the Europeans and the Americans to bring back these sanctions anytime they want, which wasn't a good idea, but this is how they reached the agreement – so what he will tell you is that in order to avoid that – because one of the requests that Europeans have is for IAEA inspectors to be allowed to go back to Iran – so what he will tell you is that we have signed an agreement for these guys to come back, but we are not going to allow them in until we make sure that this snap-back mechanism is not going be used.

So you have October 16th, which is not very far away, as the date that using a snap-back would not be allowed anymore because that is the 10th anniversary of UN resolution 2231. So if a snap-back is not used by October 16th, then they cannot use it because 2231 will disappear and all the sanctions that were lifted will continue to be lifted. So in order to pass October 16th, I think the Iranian government has decided to allow these IAEA inspectors back in Iran if a snap-back mechanism is not exercised. But if Europeans under US pressure or because of their own reasons decide to do a snap-back, I don't think the agreement that you had in Cairo would acutally happen. And the Iranian side has made sure that there are no dates. So there is commitment for IAEA inspectors to go back to Iran, but there are not dates that are set, that they would go back by this date, so that would allow Iran to pass October

16th and if the snap-back is not used, then they would allow them in. And if it's used, this is what Iran's foreign minister said, that if the snap-back is utilised, this agreement is going to be null. This is what he said when he was signing the agreement. So this is what he would tell you. But I don't like what is happening. I think Mr. Grossi is working with the Israelis. You know, he used to go to Israel before coming to Iran officially. He was not hiding his Israeli links. He wants to be the UN secretary general and he thinks the Israeli lobby will help him to get that job. So he is not a good man. He is using his current office to get a higher position and he's willing to violate all ethical standards on his way to get that position.

DL: The foreign minister indeed, and this is amongst other media organisations, Reuters reported that the foreign minister has made clear that these inspections will not resume if the snap-back provisions are implemented, but in response, the Europeans, the E3, France, Britain and Germany who have initiated the snap-back process, they said that they will refrain from going all the way with these snap-back sanctions if Iran does three things. Not only does it have to allow inspections to resume, but it also has to account for its highly enriched uranium stockpile and it has to hold nuclear talks with the United States, which obviously used the so-called peace negotiations with Iran to engage in a subterfuge, to try to deceive the Iranian government and military in advance of an Israeli attack. So do you think that there's a realistic possibility that President Pezeshkian's government will comply with all three of those demands? That it will not only allow inspections to resume, but it will account for the highly enriched uranium and resume nuclear talks with the United States?

FI: I think, I hope, that they would not do any of those things until October 16th. They need to make sure that Europeans don't use a snap-back. And once a snap-back is gone, then, I think, yes, they would allow IAEA inspectors in. When they come in, they will look for that enriched uranium. They will have some information on that. And then negotiating with the United States, as I said, was a campaign promise of Dr. Pezeshkian. So I don't think he minds going back to those talks. But the hope we have in Iran is that they have learned lessons from past mistakes and they would not trust the Americans. The hope is that they would realise that Americans generally don't keep the promises that they make. We had that experience with JCPOA. The United States left the agreement without accusing Iran of violating JCPOA because Iran was doing its part of JCPOA. He left the agreement, Trump left the agreement because of his fight with Obama. He said that this wasn't a good deal. So this is the hope we have, that the reformist government here would basically, if they want to carry with their campaign promises, at least remember what has happened to Iran in the last number of months.

DL: Now, as I understand the snap-back sanctions, Dr. Izadi, they cannot be vetoed by any permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. And obviously the most obvious, I think the most likely candidates to exercise a veto in this case, if a veto were available, would be Russia and China. Do you think that if the snap-back sanctions are implemented, that Russia and China would respect them or do you think they would simply ignore them? And if they chose to ignore them, on what basis would they do so?

FI: Both Russia and China have written official letters to the UN Security Council President

saying that the Europeans are not in a position to use a snap-back. And the three foreign ministers, Russian foreign minister, Chinese foreign minister, Iranian foreign minister wrote a joint letter last week when they were meeting in China for that Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit saying basically the same thing. They had a list of the reasons why Europeans cannot use a snap-back. One reason is that in order to use article 36 and 37 of JCPOA, you have to be following other articles as well. You cannot pick and choose. This is an ICJ decision, [inaudible] decision in 1972 that if you are part of an agreement, if you're a country that is part of an agreement then if you want to use an article of that agreement, you should be following other articles as well. And THE ICJ is the International Court of Justice. And Europeans have unofficially left the agreement seven years ago. So when Trump left the agreement officially, the Europeans also didn't do any of the obligations that they had under JCPOA. They promised Iran to do it in order to encourage Iran to stay in the agreement, but they never fulfilled any of their promises. In fact, Iran stayed more than a year in the agreement after Trump left waiting for Europeans to do their part. And the excuse that the Europeans had was that these companies that we have are under American pressure and they basically implemented European sanctions against Iran that were supposed to be lifted. Not because this was part of JCPOA, but because they said Americans are forcing us to do that. So that's number one.

The second reason is that when Americans and Israelis attacked Iran, they supported those attacks. So JCPOA was about inspecting Iranian facilities. Attacking a nuclear site is against IAEA rules. It's also against international law. You know, the Israelis and Americans did not have a UN Security Council resolution allowing an attack on Iran. Iran has never been under Article 42 of the UN Charter that allows member states to use force against that country. And instead of keeping quiet after the attack, you had the German Chancellor saying that Israel was doing the dirty job of Europeans by attacking Iran. And both the French government, the British government fully supported the attacks. The third reason is that under JCPOA Iran is allowed to enrich at 3.67%. And the Europeans a couple of weeks ago had – when we are talking about Europeans, we are talking about the UK, France and Germany – issued a statement officially saying that Iran should have zero enrichment. So that's another violation of the JCPOA.

So overall, they're not only not doing their part in JCPOA, they're actually fully in line with American-Israeli policies against Iran. And now they remember that they like JCPO and they want to use an article out of JCPO bringing all the sanctions back. So this is why both Russia and China have said that they are not in a position to use JCPOA. What will happen on September 28th, this is going to be the 30 days after the European letters to the UN Security Council – and this is another violation because if you want to use article 36 and 37, it's very specific that there are a number of steps that you need to take before that 30-day letter that they haven't done, so they even have not followed the procedure in JCPOA – but on September 28th, South Korea is the rotating president of the UN Security Council. And, you know, South Korea has been following US dictates since the Korean War. And they are going to be in line with the Europeans when it comes to Iran. You had the South Korean president in Washington a couple of weeks ago being humiliated by Trump. This is what he likes to do;

Trump is telling the South Korean government that the bases that the US has in South Korea, the land should belong to the United States. This is what Trump wants now.

So South Koreans will probably issue a resolution in line with what the Western governments want. Russia and China will oppose that resolution. They cannot veto it. But they will oppose it. So the UN Security Council has five permanent members, Russia, China, UK, France, and the United States. The United States has no say because they officially left the agreement. So at the UN Security Council, you have two countries that are saying the snap-back mechanism is not utilised. And then you have two countries that are saying that the snap mechanism is utilised. So you're going to have a disagreement within the UN security council. Among the non-permanent members, we have some countries like Algeria, Pakistan, these countries have serious doubts whether the Europeans can use a snap-back mechanism. So some of these countries, non-permanent members may also oppose. And what will happen is that you will have more or less the current situation when it comes to Iran.

Today, we have some countries under Western government's pressure that are not working with Iran, they're not trading with Iran before a snap-back mechanism is utilised. So those countries will continue not to work with Iran. So no change there. And then today, you have some countries that are working with Iran, you know. Iran is a member of the BRICS organisation. Iran is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. We have trade with members of these organisations. So there's this South-South trade relations that Iran has with major countries like China, Russia, Brazil, and other countries. So I think those trades will continue because these countries have said that they are not accepting a snap-back because the countries that want to use a snap-back are not in a position to do that. So after October 16th, I think you're going to have a situation that is more or less similar to what we had before October 16th. And this is, I think, what will take place.

DL: So if that's the case, and this is my next question to you about the snap-back provisions, it sounds like if your assessment is correct, that the economic impact on Iran of the implementation of the snap-back provisions would not be severe, if effectively the same trading relationships that currently exist will remain in place, continue to function, that this wouldn't change the economic outlook for Iran dramatically. Is that your expectation that the snap-back provisions would not have a dramatically negative impact on the Iranian economy?

FI: The Iranian economy is under oil sanctions, but these oil sanctions are not related to UN sanctions. They're American sanctions, sanctions that are passed by the US Congress. Iran doesn't have access to US dollar, not because of the UN sanctions, these are American sanctions. So the sanctions that have caused problems for Iran's economy are not UN sanctions. These are American sanctions. The UN sanctions don't deal with oil at all. There are no oil sanctions that are in place by the UN. There are a few banking issues, very very minimal banking sanctions. The serious banking sanctions are not in the UN. So overall, yes, if these sanctions come back, which, as I said, we have a disagreement at the UN Security Council whether they can come back or not, but if they come back, the economic impact is not going to be that great. That is why, you know, they have these media outlets that are financed by Netanyahu and the US government that realising that the actual text of UN

sanctions are not economic in nature are trying to use propaganda, trying to create this hysteria about a snap-back so they can have a psychological effect on Iranian markets. So they want to raise the value of dollar in Iran, talking about the snap-back when the value of dollar has nothing to do with the snap-back, but creating this psychological warfare trying to scare Iranian citizens that may have an economic impact. But the real text of the UN sanctions is not going to hurt the Iranian economy.

DL: I'd like to conclude our discussion by talking about the military situation in the country and the possibility of a resumption of armed hostilities between the Islamic Republic and the genocidal Israeli entity. There has been a lot of speculation in the alternative media that the Iranian military may be preparing a preemptive strike on Israel because Israel continues obviously to have a very hostile posture towards Iran and there is a widespread expectation that at some point or another it will attack Iran again. Do you think there's a realistic prospect of the Iranian military engaging in a preemptive strike for those reasons?

FI: No, in Iran we have this National Security Council. It is headed by the president, Dr. Pezeshkian. Ten members of this National Security Council have a voting right. They can vote on these issues. Five out of those ten belong to the executive branch. So you have the president and four ministers, the foreign minister, the intelligence ministers, others, the defence minister. These are all under the executive branch. And then the other five are if the executive branch gets one more vote from others that are members of, for example, the head of Iran's parliament or the head of Iran's judiciary – these are the other five – so if they get one more vote, it becomes six. And so it's not very difficult for the executive branch to basically lead Iran's defence policy, military policy. This is what Dr. Pezeshkian says almost every day, that we don't want to fight. As I said, this is a reformist government.

So I don't think they're going to do a preemptive strike, but they realise that if the cost to the Israelis and Americans is not huge, these type of attacks on Iran will continue because we understand that Israelis and Americans don't have any ethical standards. Their Military capacity is extensive and they don't like Iran. And Trump is going to be in the White House for the next three and a half years if he doesn't face other difficulties. So I think the calculus that Iranian leaders have, including this reformist president, is that if Iran is attacked again, the response has to be much larger to prevent these type of attacks. And Iran experienced this once; Israelis used to shoot at Iranian ships. And what Iran did was that Iran started shooting at Israeli ships, this is a few years ago. And then the Israelis stopped. So this is the only language they understand, the language of force. So I think the decision here is that this time around they're going to respond to Israeli attacks in a much more serious manner. But they're not going to be a preemptive strike, I don't think so.

DL: In terms of the seriousness of the response Iran warned three weeks ago that it had developed newer and better missiles with far greater capabilities than previous missiles, and if the Zionist enemy embarks on the adventure again, we will undoubtedly use them. Has the Iranian military disclosed any further information about the nature of these capabilities, these newer capabilities, or is that the sum total of what we know about these newer missiles?

FI: They have not, for obvious reasons. But, you know, people learn. So in that twelve day war, imposed war on Iran, the Israelis hit launching sites, these ballistic missile launching sites. There was a video that was shared a few days ago. I don't know if you have seen that, that ballistic missiles coming out of the ground. There are no launching sites. So Iran's engineering capacity is extensive. And once they realise that they're vulnerable in one area, then they will figure out ways of making sure that vulnerability is dealt with. So Iran is different from Qatar or Saudi Arabia or UAE. These guys pay billions of dollars and when they need those weapons, they're not available. Iran is not like that. Iran's missiles are made indigenously with indigenous technology. That is why they don't like Iran. They want a milking cow. And you can be a milky cow when you are totally dependent on the other side.

DL: My last question to you, Dr. Izadi, is that I was in Tehran in May of this year to attend the Sobh Media Festival and I was quite struck by – because at that point in time, there was tremendously hostile rhetoric coming out of the Trump administration and the Israeli regime towards Iran – I was struck by the calm in the city. And from my perspective, because I've never lived in a city that big, it's a massive city, it was quite well-organised, I thought. I rode the metro system and I saw a very little police presence on the street. And really, it was rather surprising in that context to see a large, complex city like Tehran functioning so normally. Since the so-called twelve-day war, has life in the capital more or less returned to normal or have there been significant changes in people's day-to-day lives as a result of this war?

FI: No. If you come to Tehran today, you would see the same thing. We don't see any difference before and after the war. During those twelve days, some people left the city, some. And the people that stayed, basically enjoyed the city more, because there was less traffic. And so even during the twelve days, I was in Tehran during that time. people in Iran have –there is this culture of resistance. And you don't have to be a supporter of the Iranian government to have that. Because even people who did not like the government realised that Iran was attacked in the middle of negotiations. They were supposed to do the sixth round two days after the attack. So the attacks came two days before the next round of negotiations. Witkoff had officially said that he would be in Muscat for those attacks. Trump had a tweet just a few hours before the attacks saying that he's hopeful that the negotiations will be positive. Now obviously we realise that these negotiations were a deception operation trying to surprise the Iranian side. But people realised that. So we had this rally around the flag effect when the attacks happened among all people. And the aim of those attacks was regime change. That's why they attacked the Iranian radio, television stations, they attacked the prison. If you are worried about nuclear facilities you would hit nuclear facilities. Not a prison. They hit the door of the prison in order for the prisoners to come out, maybe go to the television station and take over the station, whatever reason they had. So people realised that Netanyahu wants to do a regime change. And even the people who did not like the government don't want to be on the same team as a genocidal maniac that everybody knows is not interested in the well-being of Iran. He's not even interested in the wellbeing of Israel, he is doing a genocide to keep in power. So many people realised that, so they don't fall for this type of gimmicks.

DL: Well, it's been a great pleasure talking to you today Dr. Izadi and I hope we'll have the opportunity to continue the conversation in the future.

FI: Thank you. Come to Tehran, let me know. We'll come and pick you up from the airport.

DL: That would be my pleasure and I will certainly do so.

FI: Thank you.

DL: And for now we're signing off from Tehran and Kalamata on September 11th, 2025.

END

Thank you for reading this transcript. Please don't forget to donate to support our independent and non-profit journalism:

BANKKONTO:

Kontoinhaber: acTVism München e.V.
Bank: GLS Bank
IBAN: DE89430609678224073600
BIC: GENODEM1GLS

PAYPAL:

E-Mail:
PayPal@acTVism.org

PATREON:

<https://www.patreon.com/acTVism>

BETTERPLACE:

Link: [Click here](#)