



FROM IRAN: Why the U.S. Is Striking – and Why It Will Fail

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Dimitri Lascaris: Good day, this is Dimitri Lascaris coming to you from Mashhad, Iran on July 10th, 2026, for Reason2Resist. Yesterday was the final day for the funeral of Iran's martyred supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. A little later in this report, I'll share with you the stunning footage of this remarkable final day. I've been in Iran for the entire period of the seven-day funeral, and like all other days I have been here, yesterday's proceedings drew huge masses of people who expressed their grief, indignation, and defiance at the United States and Israel. But before I share with you footage of yesterday's events, I want to talk to you about the ongoing US war of aggression against this country.

This week, after Iran targeted non-compliant commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz using non-lethal force, the US bombed Iranian ports and bridges. In so doing, US forces killed more than a dozen martyrs. The aggressor murdered at least three people in Iran's southwestern Khuzestan province – a firefighter in an airport in the southeastern city of Iranshahr, and nine members of the Iranian military. Iranian state media also reported explosions in several cities, including Bushehr, which houses Iran's nuclear power plant complex. And apparently, although those airstrikes did not hit the nuclear plant, they did strike nearby.

Iran's military has responded with dozens of strikes on US military bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it carried out attacks on, quote, "key infrastructure and facilities", close quote, at bases used by the criminal US military in Arifjan and Ali Al Salem in Kuwait, Juffair and Shaikh Isa in Bahrain, and also, I believe, Al Udeid in Qatar. Most importantly, perhaps, Iran fired 10 ballistic missiles at Jordan's Azraq military base, according to the IRGC in a statement carried by state media yesterday. Jordan's armed forces said it had intercepted eight Iranian missiles in the airspace after sirens sounded across the country, adding that falling shrapnel did not cause any casualties or material damage. So assuming that Iran did in fact fire 10 ballistic missiles, that would mean that Jordan intercepted 80% of them.

Well, I find that rather difficult to believe and I'll tell you why – because former MIT professor Ted Postol, who is one of the leading weapons experts in the West and was an advisor to the Pentagon, has done some very interesting interviews about this subject, about the ability of US air defense systems to intercept ballistic missiles, he did a recent interview in particular on the Daniel Davis program, I think it was about three weeks ago, in which he explained why he has concluded that the Patriot Air Defense System, which is essentially the best air defense system that the United States has and provides to its vessels only intercepts about 2 to 3 % of ballistic missiles. It may be quite good when it comes to dealing with slow moving drones or subsonic cruise missiles, perhaps even non hypersonic missiles, although possessing supersonic speeds, perhaps they can take out a significant proportion of those. But missiles that travel at hypersonic speeds, which is the velocity that these ballistic missiles reach when they enter the atmosphere and hurdle towards the earth, according to Theodor Postl, 2 to 3 % is probably the interception rate. So even if they had taken out one of these 10 missiles, they would have been lucky to do that. That would have an interception of 10 %, you know, 4 to 5 times above the average interception rate according to the conclusions of Professor Postol.

We also know, by the way, that, although fantastical claims were made throughout the Ramadan war about the proportion of Iranian ballistic missiles that were being intercepted by the Gulf Arab autocracies that house these US military bases, we know from the corporate media in the United States and satellite imagery that in fact there was enormous damage done to numerous of these bases, rendering, in excess of 10 of them according to the Western corporate media, inoperable. So if these air defense systems are nearly as successful as is claimed by countries like Jordan, then you would not expect to see that level of damage in US military bases in this region. The IRGC says that in Jordan it targeted a US command and control facility. 10 ballistic missiles can do a hell of a lot of damage to a facility of that nature. For the being we can't say here on Reason2Resist, how much damage was done, but with time we may well find out, particularly as satellite imagery emerges, and if we do find out we'll certainly share that information with you.

In its newsletter this morning, The New York Times published a commentary by New York Time staff writer Katrin Bennhold. Her commentary concerned the debate in Iran before those who want negotiations with the US to continue and those who wanted them to end. As is customary in the corporate media, Bennhold describes those who want negotiations to end as "hardliners". She claims that the hardliners in Iran constitute a minority albeit a powerful one. She also says that the hardliners, quote, "prefer war", close quote. Bennhold writes that the hardliners used the occasion of the supreme leader's funeral this past week to physically attack government officials who have been defending the ceasefire with the United States. On Monday, she says, there was a particularly notable incident when, according to her, a crowd tried to tackle President Masoud Pezeshkian during a funeral procession while shouting, quote, "death to the appeaser", close quote. Bennhold says, quote, "he swayed, looking dazed, as security detail guided him away". She goes on and writes, "Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was struck with a rock as he was chased down an alley during the funeral. The attackers waving flags cursed him and called for his death.".

Now I've not seen footage of these incidents and cannot confirm whether these events actually occurred, but if they did occur, I wouldn't be surprised, not based on what I've seen and heard in the streets of Tehran and Mashhad all week. That being said, I take strong issue with several aspects of Bennhold's article. First of all, if it is in fact true that irate Iranian citizens threatened the president and the foreign minister in that way – and I'm not suggesting that they were going to lynch them or anything like that, I have no reason to believe that they intended to carry out any kind of a death threat or even cause them grievous bodily injury – but just taking at face value what she said they did, if in fact they did that, it seems a little difficult to reconcile with the narrative that the Iranian government is a brutally oppressive regime that is effectively dictatorial. Would people behave this way in a country, ordinary citizens, towards the president and the foreign minister, especially during a critically important state event, if they were liable to be carted off to prison and tortured, or worse, for offending the dignity of the president, and the foreign minister in that manner? Bennhold doesn't seem to grasp that there's an inconsistency between what she recounts happened this week and the New York Times standard editorial line that the Iranian government is one of the most repressive and dictatorial regimes on earth.

But there are other aspects of this with which I take greater exception. First of all her use of the term "hardliners". You know, you aren't a "hardliner" because you believe that there is nothing to be gained by negotiating with that psychopath, pathologically lying, narcissistic, megalomaniac, and genocidal Donald Trump. That's just common sense. Why would anyone, thinking rationally, looking at the way Donald Trump has behaved believe that those negotiations are going to result in an agreement that Donald Trump will respect and that will be in the interests of the Iranian people and the Iranian state? That's simply an irrational belief. So I think a far more accurate term of the so-called "hardliners" is realists. Or I would call them pragmatists. They're being practical, they're being realistic. They're looking at Donald Trump's behavior and they're saying, "this is a pointless exercise and if we do any kind of a deal, he's going to use it to somehow disadvantage us even further than he's already done". But she characterizes them as hardliners, which obviously carries a negative connotation. It suggests that these people are extremists, that they're inflexible, that they can't be reasoned with, when the reality is that they are being all too reasonable, they see the reality of what Donald Trump is, and they are urging upon their government a policy which takes into account that reality. Namely that negotiations with this monster are a fool's errand and likely only to lead to further disadvantages for the nation of Iran and its people.

Now, she goes on and she says that the so-called hardliners constitute a minority. A claim for which she provides zero evidence. That's a pretty important claim to be making at this point in time when the negotiations between the United States and Iran have broken down and this is a war that has potentially profound consequences for the global economy and the US economy included. So I would say that it's journalistically incumbent upon her to provide some kind of evidence, something to back up the claim that these so-called hardliners constitute a minority. Now, I don't have polling evidence to provide to you, and if I knew of any, I would. I would cite it to you whether or not it is consistent with my own experience.

But I can tell you what my own experiences for what it's worth, though it doesn't have anywhere close to the evidentiary value of scientifically valid polls. But nonetheless, it's something.

And I can tell you that going through the streets of Iran and interacting with people, I saw enormous amounts of hostility towards the negotiation process and immense skepticism. I heard this over and over again. I saw quite literally, people chanting against negotiations and carrying banners opposed to negotiations – probably in the tens of thousands. And that's just what I saw in the streets. So I really question whether these people constitute a minority. I think it's entirely possible that a majority of Iranians think that it is contrary to the interests of the Iranian state to be negotiating with this mendacious psychopath. And as I say, that's simply logical. And my sense is that most Iranians have common sense and they are fundamentally rational people. And if that is the case, and they're paying attention, as I'm sure they are, to Donald Trump's current behavior and his record, the majority would be of the view that these negotiations should be brought to an end forthwith and perhaps that they should never have been undertaken to begin with.

The third claim with which I want to take exception in this Bennhold piece of toilet paper is the claim that the so-called hardliners prefer war. I haven't met a single person in Iran of the many people I've met during my three trips to and across this country during the past 14 months, who actually wants war. Not a single one. Such people may exist, but if they were here in significant numbers and if the so-called hardliners with whom I've had extensive interaction preferred war, then presumably I would have met at least a few of them by now, but I've met none of them. What the Iranian people want, let's be very clear about this, Ms. Bennhold, they want the war to be brought to an end as expeditiously as possible, but they want it to be ended permanently. I repeat, permanently. They don't want to be turned into Lebanon or Syria or Libya that is in a constant state of vulnerability, a constant state of war, a war which simply varies from time to time in intensity, but which is never ending and permanently enfeebles the state. That's what they don't want. And they understand perfectly well that after having kicked the asses of the Americans and the Israelis in the most recent war and in the June war of last year the Israelis and the Americans are opting for Plan B. And Plan B is this low-intensity intermittent war which doesn't cause catastrophic damage all at once, but which over time gradually weakens the state and the nation to the point that they can no longer defend themselves and there's a breakdown of a civil order and civilized life. That is what the Americans and the Israelis have in store through this negotiating process, which is a complete fraud as is now as clear as day. And the Iranian people understand this perfectly well. So they don't think that this course of action, the one being pursued – not all Iranians, but in my view, probably a majority of them – don't think that the course of actions that has been pursued thus far by the government is likely to lead to a permanent end in the war.

What will lead to a permanent end to the war? In my view it is exactly what I've been saying for months – and my view has been strengthened over time by the kinds of things we have witnessed this week: relentless violations of the MOU and various other ceasefire agreements

by the United States and Israel. What has to happen is that Iran has to inflict such a penalty on the United States – Israel is really secondary in all of this because if the United States wants the war to be ended permanently, it will be ended permanently whether or not Israel wants that. So it has to really inflict upon the United States a penalty that is so severe that the next time it's tempted to attack Iran, it will decide not to do that because the pain of doing so will simply be too great. And how can Iran inflict a penalty of that nature? By shutting down the Strait of Hormuz.

We just did a press conference with the Iranian parliamentarian, Ebrahim Azizi, who is the chair of the Parliament's National Security Commission. We published that this morning. And we were allowed to ask him questions, any questions we wanted. There were no restrictions placed upon our questions. And a lot of people in that room, foreign journalists, yours truly included, expressed skepticism about the wisdom of pursuing these negotiations any further. And one question which I asked, it's at the very beginning of the video we published this morning, or near the beginning, was in light of the many violations of the MOU by the Trump regime – and in particular the fact that it is now reimposed sanctions on the sale of Iranian oil – what are the benefits to Iran of continuing to comply with the MOU? And isn't in fact the more logical approach to close the Strait of Hormuz again to impose maximum pressure on the United States economy and through it the government of the United States? And I commend you, if you want to see the answer that I got back from Mr. Azizi that you watch this. Another person also asked in this same video that we published, whether Iran entered into the MOU too early, because it was on the cusp of causing serious harm to the United States economy, just as the United States, by the way, has been doing to the Iranian economy for decades. And so, again, the answer to that question may interest you, and if you want to hear what Mr. Azizi had to say, I recommend that you watch the video of the press conference which we published this morning.

But in any case, the point here is: I don't believe, and I suspect that a great many Iranians don't believe, that the Iranian government has so far gone far enough to establish real deterrence. That's what they want. They want real deterrence so that the war is brought to a permanent end and they're not indefinitely subjected to the the interminable suffering of an intermittent, low intensity war. So that again, Ms Bennhold, if you happen to be listening to my comments today, that's what the Iranian people want. Your racist notion that there are some wild-eyed savages who love war or that any segment of the Iranian society is like that really is a disgrace. Like all human beings, they desire peace, overwhelmingly. And if there are any people in this country who actually do prefer war, I assure you that they are a tiny minority.

Now, I want to close out with a couple of other points about what has happened over the last couple of days. We will be heading back to Tehran later this evening by train. It's a 12-hour train ride. We got here by train about three days ago. Our voyage back to Tehran was complicated by the fact that the Trump regime bombed railway bridges connecting Tehran to Mashhad. And in fact, we passed over one of these bridges on our way here. Now, we were therefore uncertain whether we were going to be able to take the train back to Tehran, and I

do need to go back for one day before leaving the country and returning to Canada, but we are told that the government seems to have found a solution quickly dealing with the problem created by the bombing of the civilian infrastructure. By the way, this railroad is very important. It's strategically important to Iran because it connects Iran, I understand, to China and also to Russia. So that will tell you something about the motivation of the United States for bombing this civilian infrastructure. And of course there's the additional motivation it may have had that people were traveling from the capital to Mashhad for the final day of the supreme leader's funeral. But I suspect the main motivation was to impede economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its partners China and Russia.

In the days ahead I guess we'll find out whether the Iranian government has gotten the message which I think a great many of its citizens tried to convey during the past week as to the way they feel about negotiations with the sociopath in the White House. With that, let's turn to the footage of the final day of the Supreme Leader's funeral, which took place yesterday. I'll just mention briefly, you'll see that as this on-the-ground report yesterday unfolds we had expected that the coffins of the martyrs would be brought down one of the main boulevards leading to the Imam Reza Shrine where the martyr Ali Khamenei was finally laid to rest last night. But in fact, they were not brought down through the main boulevards, and we were not able to view at the end of the day the delivery of the coffins to the shrine. We learned that they had arrived by video feed on Iranian state media, but you will see in the video I'm about to show you the extraordinary and impressive gathering of masses of people both inside and around the Imam Reza Shrine as they waited for the arrival of the body of their beloved and martyred leader. And at the very end of this clip that I'm about to show you from last night's events, you will hear a gigantic throng of mourners chanting in unison. And the words that they chanted were quite powerful. They were: "All these armies have come for the love of their leader".

This is Dimitri Lascaris coming to you on July 9th, 2026 from Mashhad, Iran. This is the site of the last day of the seven-day program for the funeral of the martyred Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. We have been here in the country every step of the way, in the streets, at the mosques where mourners gathered to pay their respects and to grieve and also to express their indignation. And all of it will culminate in a few hours' time at the Imam Reza Shrine, which is directly in front of me at a distance of a couple of hundred meters. But for the time being I want to show you what is behind me. That is the Imam Reza Boulevard, and as you can see it is absolutely jam-packed with mourners as far as the eye can see. And the coffin of the supreme leader along with the coffins of his martyred family members are, we understand, somewhere down that absolutely jam-packed boulevard. And they should have arrived by now at the shrine, but because of the great mass of people who have assembled there waiting for the coffins to arrive, their arrival has been much delayed. And we are going to share with you in a few moments footage of what I just saw and experienced down in the streets both on Imam Reza Boulevard and on our way from a hotel which is near the main entrance to this gigantic shrine complex. But I'm going to start by showing you what I can see right now looking in front of me at the shrine.

So we've now left that very tall hotel where we had this magnificent view of Imam Reza Boulevard and the Imam Reza Shrine and we're back down in the streets below. We have learned that in fact the coffin bearing the body of the Supreme Leader is not going to be delivered via Imam Reza Boulevard, but rather another avenue that passes directly in front of the hotel we're staying at, which is a smaller hotel, an eight-floor hotel. And that news, by the way, has been spread publicly, so you can see that there are a lot of people walking in the direction of our hotel, which is about a couple hundred meters away. And we plan to go onto the rooftop of our hotel so that we can see the coffin of the martyred supreme leader go by as it enters the shrine complex. More water to keep us cool. We've now returned to our hotel and are still waiting for the coffin of the martyred supreme leader and those of his slain family members to enter the shrine. We expect that that's going to happen shortly.

END

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