# Episode 8: The Russia I Saw

*This transcript may not be 100% accurate due to audio quality or other factors.*

**John Mearsheimer:** What I have to say is a pretty good representation of what the foreign policy elite in Russia is thinking. Hi, this is John Mearsheimer. I would like to speak today in this episode about my recent trip to Russia, which took place between September 8th and September 12th. Those were the days that I was in the country, not traveling there. I started off in Moscow, and I spent a few days in Moscow. And then the second half of my trip was in St. Petersburg. And what exactly did I do there? I gave a series of talks. I participated in some roundtable discussions. I interviewed a number of people who I have known over the years. I had dinner one evening with the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, which lasted for well over two hours at his residence. And I spent a lot of time wandering around during the daytime and in the evening in both Moscow and St. Petersburg because I like to walk and I wanted to see both of those cities or at least as much of those cities as I could see by walking around. Who exactly did I talk to? I talked to a large number of people. Who I would describe as being members of the foreign policy elite inside of Russia. I talked to a number of people who I know going back to the days of the Cold War when they were Soviet citizens, not Russian citizens. As I said, I talked to the Foreign Minister Lavrov and I talked to his deputy, who I have talked to in the past when I went to Russia. And I think I got a pretty good feel from talking to everyone that I just mentioned sort of how the Russian elite in general is thinking about the present situation regarding the Ukraine war. But nevertheless, having said all that, you should understand that what I have to say is largely anecdotal. I didn't go in and do a survey of what elite opinion is on a particular issue. And I certainly didn't talk to large numbers of people in the street. So, this is anecdotal. But I think what I have to say is a pretty good representation of what the foreign policy elite in Russia is thinking.

Let me start by talking about what I saw regarding daily life inside of Moscow and Saint Petersburg. I would say it was remarkably normal – there were a few signs of a war taking place. Walking around in those two cities is not much different than walking around in places like New York or places like Chicago. There were a few signs of the war, however. I think the most obvious sign was that at a number of what they call petrol stations or what we call gas stations, you saw long lines. In some cases, the lines included maybe 15 or 20 cars. In one case, I think the line probably included about 40 to 50 cars. That was not true at every petrol station or gas station, but it was true at a number of them, and this is consistent with what we read in the newspapers. Some other signs of the war that I would note – first of all, the

sanctions have had a significant effect in the sense that if you go into Russia, you cannot use your own credit card or an American credit card, and you can't use American money. I did not go into Russian realizing that. So I was effectively penniless when I was in Russia. If I went to a store or went to a coffee shop, I had to make sure I went with somebody who could pay for me because I had no ability to pay. I couldn't use any of my credit cards. I couldn't use American dollars. You could only use Russian credit cards or rubles and I didn't have any of them. Correspondingly, the Russians cannot use American credit cards. So if you're a Russian and you want to subscribe to the New York Times, you can't use an American credit card to subscribe because an American credit card can't be used in Russia. So you would have to use your Russian credit card, but the problem is you can use a Russian credit in the West. So any Russian who wants to subscribe to The New York Times or The Wall Street Journal or some Substack site, cannot do it through normal channels. So you see the effect of sanctions there. One other sign of the effect of sanctions was that there were a number of coffee shops that you could tell were once Starbucks coffee shops that are now Star coffee shops but have an emblem that resembles or a symbol that resembles the old Starbucks symbol that was once there. But nevertheless, despite the long lines that I saw at a few gas stations, and despite the problem with credit cards and using dollars, there were hardly any signs that normal life was not going on inside of both Moscow and St. Petersburg. If you went into restaurants, you looked around in department stores or drug stores, and you walked around on the streets, everything looked remarkably normal. Just one final point on this, before the war started on February 24th of 2022, it was possible to fly from the United States or from Europe into Russia. That's no longer the case. So I had to fly from Chicago to Istanbul and then from Istanbul into Russia because you cannot fly directly from any place in the West to inside Russia.

Let me talk a little bit about the economy. As I'm sure almost everybody knows when the war started, our goal was to bring the Russian economy to its knees, to do egregious damage to the Russian economy. It was widely believed that that would help us in effect win the war against Russia. You see no signs that the Russian economy is in trouble. This is not to argue that everything is honky-dory with the Russian economy, but it did not seem to me that there was any evidence that the Russian economy was struggling. And there was nobody that I talked to who talked about economic problems or dangers ahead regarding the Russian economy. There may be lurking problems there that people are concerned about and they just didn't tell me. But all I would say is that the whole time I was there, I saw no signs that the Russian economy is in trouble. In fact, it looked like the Russian is doing quite well. And again, nobody in the time I was there, said that the Russians were concerned about where their economy was headed. Now, I would note that the situation in Russia is fundamentally different from the situation in Ukraine. There were just many times when I was observing what was going on in Russia, I thought to myself, how does this compare to what's going on in Ukraine? And it's quite clear that the Ukrainians are in a very different situation. And in fact, one of the days that I was in Russia, a headline appeared in the New York Times that said that the Ukrainians desperately needed $27 billion more in economic and military aid. They were in effect running out of money. And what this points up is that the Ukrainian economy has basically been wrecked and Ukraine is in need of great support from the West to

survive. The Ukrainians could not fight the war without massive amounts of economic assistance from the West. The situation is fundamentally different in Russia. Russia is not depending on assistance from anyone. And as I said, I do not believe the Russian economy is in desperate straits. There is no evidence of that. It seems to be humming along relatively well. And again, that situation contrasts with the situation in Ukraine. And furthermore, I had no sense that there were food shortages or that people were suffering in any meaningful way inside of Russia, whereas there's no question that that is the case inside of Ukraine, especially in recent months with the shutdown of Black Sea ports in Ukraine. So there's a fundamental difference here between the two.

One final point on that has to do with weaponry. It's quite clear that not only is the Russian economy in quite good shape, but the Russians are producing massive amounts of weaponry, people talked about that quite often. The number of weapons that are coming off the assembly lines is quite impressive. And again, the exact opposite is the case in Ukraine. Ukraine is desperate for weapons from the West. You hear the Ukrainians constantly talking about the need for Patriot missiles, the so-called PAC-3 missiles, to help them deal with the Russian onslaught of missiles and drones. But the West is in no position to give Ukraine the weaponry it needs to deal with those aerial attacks from Russia. But on the Russian side, again, there's no shortage of weaponry, both defensive missiles and offensive missiles. So the contrast between Russia and Ukraine is quite stark, and I think the Ukrainians are in real trouble. And as I say, when you talk about the economy, I think in the Russian case, things are in pretty good shape.

Now, let's talk a little bit about the political situation inside of Russia. It has long been argued in the West that Putin is in political trouble and that he may be toppled. And of course, the belief in the West is that if Putin is toppled, he will be replaced by a more reasonable person. And by that, most people in the best believe that his replacement would be someone who was willing to negotiate an end to the war with the West. That person would be more dovish or softer than Putin, who is widely seen in the West as highly aggressive. Now, I pushed people very hard on this particular issue, and people would talk about it, but I do want to emphasize that I think there are limits to what people would say. I think most people are reluctant to be too critical of Putin for obvious reasons. So, I'm aware that people were not completely frank on this particular issue. Nevertheless, I saw no evidence of the belief that Putin was in trouble politically and that he was likely to be toppled because of dissatisfaction with his leadership. It may be the case that behind the scenes forces are at play that are going to bring Putin down at some point in time for one reason or another, but all I would say is I did not see a hint of that argument.

There's no question that there has been dissatisfaction for Putin for a few years now. You want to remember the war has been going on for more than four years. We're now into the fifth year of the war. And I would say over the past two, maybe three years, there has been dissatisfaction with Putin. But the dissatisfaction has to do with the fact that many people believe, and they will say this to you, that he has not been waging the war vigorously enough, that he has not been tough enough in attacking Ukraine, both on the battlefield and with the

air war. It's important to emphasize that that situation has been rectified. Since about June, the Russians have greatly ramped up their attacks on Ukraine. And it is unequivocally clear that they're going to increase the intensity of the attacks on Ukraine moving forward. So that dissatisfaction with Putin that once existed because many people felt he was not waging the war with sufficient vigor has gone away. So the dissatisfactions is in effect gone away Now all of this tells you that if Putin were to be replaced, let's assume that Putin had a heart attack and could not continue being the Russian president and somebody came into office to replace him, that person would be at least as hawkish as him, if not more hawkish. Even if Putin had been replaced a year or two ago, the person who replaced him would not have been more interested in accommodating the West. There's no evidence that the widespread belief in the West that Putin's replacement would have been something of a pussycat was correct. If anything, Putin's replacement would have been a hardliner. But the point I'm making to you now is that Putin has become a hardliner when it comes to the whole question of how to wage this war. And the Russians are waging the war very vigorously.

One other point about the politics that's worth making, it's very clear from talking to Russians, and listening to what they have to say about their country and what's going on, that they're very nationalistic, that all sorts of people will talk about Russian civilization in a proud way, they will distinguish Russia from the West, and it's very clear that a good number of Russians that I talk to do not like the West because they do not like liberal values. And the values that they privilege focus more on things like civilization, like religion, Christianity in particular, the family, what one would call traditional values, a lot of emphasis on traditional values among people that I spoke to. And those people sometimes distinguish the traditional values that they privilege in Russia from liberal values in the West. In a funny way, when I talked to a number of Russians about this subject of Russian nationalism, they sounded a lot like J.D. Vance. So that's what I would say about the political situation inside of Russia based on my conversations.

Now let me say some words on what I think the course of the war looks like. I think, as I said, the Russians this past summer decided to escalate in a massive way. As I've talked about in previous episodes, the Russians have basically turned Ukraine into a landlocked country. And they have shut down all the Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which is causing massive economic problems inside of Ukraine. The Russians have also made it clear that they're going to try to totally destroy the energy infrastructure inside of the Ukraine. And what's important to understand here is that for political reasons, the Russians have no choice but to escalate. Putin clearly understands, and the Russian elite clearly understands that it's politically unacceptable to let this war just go on and on and that it's politically unacceptable to let the Ukrainians attack targets inside of Russia with their drones. And there's no question that that is happening, although I saw virtually no evidence of those Ukrainian drone attacks when I was in either Saint Petersburg or in Moscow, save for the long lines at the gasoline station. But other than that, there was no evidence of the air campaign that Ukraine is waging against Russia. Nevertheless, it's quite clear the Russians consider this to be intolerable, and they are bent on ending it. They are bent on ending the war, and the way they're going to do that is to

escalate. So the politics of the conflict leave the Russians no choice but to escalade, and escalate they will.

When you talk about what this all leads to, the Russians will make it clear that they intend to win the war. And they're actually quite confident about that. I was a bit taken aback by how sure of themselves the Russian elites were that they were going to win the war, and I think that's due in part, again, based on my conversations, to the fact that the Russians believe the Ukrainians are in deep trouble. And that Russia can ramp up the pressure on Ukraine and basically bring this war to an end. Now, let me talk a little bit about what escalation means here. I think the Russians see themselves as putting great pressure on Ukraine up on the front lines on what we like to call the battlefield. And there's a clear understanding that there are significant cracks in the frontline forces on the Ukrainian side, and that the Russians are making significant progress, but the progress is slow. And everybody will tell you, unsurprisingly, that that's because of the drones. There's no question that the drones have changed the nature of what's happening on the battlefield in quite profound ways. A number of Ukrainians said to me that if there were no drones, this war would have ended two, maybe three years ago. I think that's correct. I think it would have ended more like one or two years ago if there were no drones. Drones have allowed the Ukrainians to hold off the Russians on the battlefield. So when the Russians talk now about escalating and finishing off the Ukrainians, the emphasis is not so much on the battlefield itself – the battlefield defined in rather narrow terms, talking about what's happening up on the front lines. I think the Russians believe that they will deliver the coup de grace by basically wrecking Ukraine in terms of its economic and military infrastructure behind the front lines. I think that the Russians believe that cutting off Ukraine from its Black Sea ports, destroying its energy infrastructure, destroying all sorts of military infrastructure in rear areas to include things like bridges, railroad lines, locomotives, gas stations, and so forth and so on, will do so much damage to the Ukrainian economy and to the support system behind the Ukraine frontline forces that those frontline forces will just collapse and Russia will win the war. So what I'm trying to say here is that what's happening up on the battlefield, narrowly defined, does matter for sure to the Russians. But I think at this point in time, the Russians tend to believe that the strategic bombing campaign is their real ace in the hole. And now that they have decided since the summer of this year to really ramp up that campaign, they think they can bring the Ukrainians to their knees. And just one final point about this, to tie it back to the discussion of the economy. The fact that the Russians have this ability to produce vast amounts of weaponry, vast amounts of ballistic missiles and drones and aircraft and so forth and so on, is what I think gives them confidence that they can wreck the Ukrainian economy and they can wreck that military support system behind the front lines as well. My final point here – and I said this before but I think it's important to emphasize it because almost everybody I talked to was very confident that Russia is going to win this war.

Let me switch gears now and talk about how the Russians think about their adversaries. I think with regard to the Ukrainians, I did not have the sense that there was any deep hatred inside of Russia towards the Ukrainians. And the reason is that many Russians who I talked to emphasize that they had relatives who lived in Ukraine. There are huge numbers of

Russians who have both what one might call a Ukrainian heritage and a Russian heritage. And lots of Russians that I talked to viewed Ukrainians as blood brothers and blood sisters. This is not to say that they don't understand that there's a war taking place between Ukraine and Russia and there's obviously a huge amount of animosity that comes with that on the Russian side. But I do think that on the Russian side anyway, that animosity was somewhat qualified by the fact that Russians and Ukrainians, ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians have intermingled over time. And therefore, there are lots of people who have both Russian and Ukrainian heritage. And that, I think, ameliorates the level of animosity. And, by the way, many people, I'm sure, remember the famous article that Vladimir Putin wrote on July 12th, 2021. This was about six months before the war broke out. Putin wrote this famous article where he emphasized that Ukrainians and Russians were part of one large family and he did not see a clear distinction between Russians on one hand and Ukrainians on the other hand. What I'm saying here is that in my conversations with Russians during my recent trip, there were lots of people who basically were making the same argument that Putin made in that famous July 12th, 2021 article that he wrote. So I would just say that when it comes to Russian views of the Ukrainian people and the country of Ukraine, the animosity is somewhat qualified, and I don't want to overstate the case here because I understand that a war is taking place.

Now, putting the Ukrainians aside and focusing on the Europeans, the Europeans are the ultimate bad guys for the Russians. You see that very clearly with everyone you talk to, and this is certainly true in the dinner that I had with Foreign Minister Lavrov. The Europeans are seen as being bent on destroying Russia, knocking Russia out of the ranks of the great powers, and I think the Russians believe that the Europeans want to use Ukraine to achieve that goal. The Russians believe the Europeans themselves don't want to do the fighting, but they do the fighting and dying. All for the purposes of wrecking Russia as a great power. To take this a step further, it's very clear that the Europeans view the British and the Germans as the ultimate bad guys. They believe that Britain has long been the driving force behind European policy. And now the Germans, under Chancellor Merz, have become a huge problem. You want to remember that the Second World War is emblazoned in the brains of almost everyone in the Russian elite, and the Second world war involves the events on the Eastern front between June 22, 1941 and May 8, 1945. The Russians are well aware of the enormous damage, the death and destruction that the Germans inflicted on Russia. So Germany is a very special threat to Russia because of what happened in World War II. So when Chancellor Merz begins to talk about the Russians as the font of all evil and he begins to emphasize that something has to be done to bring the Russians to their knees, this resonates in all sorts of negative ways with the Russians. So what I'm saying to you is from a Russian point of view, it's the Europeans who are the real devils in this story. And it is the British and the Germans, among the European countries, who the Russians loathed the most.

Then we get to the Americans. I think that there's no question that the Russians understand that the Americans started out to wreck Russia as a great power, to knock Russia off the list of great powers. That was true in the Biden administration. But I think that most Russians I talk to do believe that President Trump was interested in trying to work out a deal with the

Russians to not only end the war in Ukraine, but to improve relations between Russia on one hand and the United States on the other hand. I think the Russians understood that Trump, to put it in general terms, had good intentions. He was not Joe Biden. But I think that the Russians came to believe that Trump was incapable of reaching an agreement, that Trump and Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are basically incompetent, that there's no way that they can settle this war. And what happened at Anchorage is just evidence of this. So let me talk a little bit about Anchorage. And remember here, what I'm trying to do is explain to you why the Russians have come to think that the Americans are basically stumble bumps. And here we're talking about the Americans under President Trump. The Anchorage meeting in August of 2025, remember President Trump comes into the White House in January of 2025 and he begins to go to work to try and settle the war in Ukraine. He had promised, as I'm sure everybody remembers, that he was going to settle it even before he got in the White house, if he could. And once he got back in the white house, he would settle it very quickly. So he went to work to do that, President Trump, shortly after moving back into the White House. And over the course of the summer of 2025, he sent Steve Witkoff to Moscow, and Witkoffe met with Putin. And it turns out that they basically worked out a compromised settlement. And then President Trump and President Putin met at Anchorage in mid-August of 2025 for the purposes of shaking hands and agreeing between themselves that the deal that Witkoff and Putin had worked out was satisfactory to both sides. And it's important to emphasize that this was a compromise deal. The Russians actually made a number of compromises that I did not think they would make. And at the time, this was in mid-August 2025, I didn't believe the stories that Putin had agreed to the deal that had been worked out between the two sides. It just didn't make sense to me that Putin would be willing to make such compromises. But it was quite clear from talking to the Russians, and especially from talking to Foreign Minister Lavrov, that the Russians did compromise. And basically what happened here is that the Russians made some important compromises regarding territory.

And let me explain what I mean by that. There were four oblasts that the Russians had annexed. Before President Trump moved back into office in January 2025. And two of those oblasts are in the Donbass and the other two are Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. And the Russians had annexed the territory and all four of those Oblasts. But the deal that had been worked out in Anchorage was that the Ukrainians would withdraw from the territory in the Donbass, the two oblasts in the Donbass. They would withdraw from that territory and of course the Russians would take control of the entire Donbass. But the Russians agreed that the line of conflict in Zaporizhzhia and the line of conflict in Kherson would remain in place. And in effect, the Russians would not demand that they get control of all of Zaporizhzhia and all of Kherson, even though they had formally annexed both of those oblasts. So the Russians were making an important compromise on territory regarding Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. And this is what I didn't think they would agree to, but I was wrong. The Russians made this deal with Trump. And they had every reason to believe that Trump was committed to the deal, in large part because it was proposed by Steve Witkoff. It's just very important to understand that this compromise was proposed by Witkoff before the Anchorage meeting, agreed to by Witcoff and Trump before Anchorage, and then agreed to at Anchorage by Trump and Putin.

And what happened was, Trump was unable, after the meeting in Anchorage, to get the Ukrainians and the Europeans to agree to the deal. Trump had told Putin that he could get the Ukrainians and the Europeans on board. Putin and Trump both understood, of course, that the two of them agreeing to a compromise deal was a giant first step in terms of getting a peace settlement, but you had to get the Europeans and you had to get the Ukrainians on board, Trump was confident he could do that. But what happened is after Anchorage, the Europeans and the Ukrainians and the hardliners in the United States all went to work on Trump. And Trump backed off. He walked away, in effect, from Anchorage. And I would argue, by the way, that it was remarkably foolish of the Ukrainians to walk away from this deal. This was hardly a perfect deal for the Ukrainians because they were going to end up surrendering quite a bit of territory. But I think from Ukraine's point of view, it would have been much better to accept that deal. Than to accept the deal that they're going to have to accept when this war finally ends. They're going to be much worse off when this finally ends than they would have been had they accepted the agreement worked out in Anchorage. But be that as it may, the fact is that the deal never materialized because Trump could not get the Ukrainians and the Europeans and the hardliners in the United States to sign on to the arrangement that had been worked out in Anchorage. The end result of this is that the Russians have lost all faith in President Trump's ability to negotiate. I mean, Putin may still meet with Witkoff and Kushner, but he's just going through the motions. The Russians understand full well that the Americans are not capable of delivering. And therefore, this war... Has to be settled militarily. It has to settle on the battlefield and with the air war, this is the one-two punch that the Russians are relying on to win this war.

Let me close here by talking about what I think the final deal will look like. I've emphasized for a couple of years now that the Russians would win an ugly victory. This has been my argument all along. And I use this rhetoric in my conversations with a number of Russians. I asked them point after point what the final would look like, What do they think? The settlement is going to look like, how do they think this war is going to end? I found that virtually nobody would answer that question in a concrete way. No one would say what the final arrangement will look like. At some point we're going to get into a frozen conflict. So what's the frozen conflict look like? What are the territorial lines? What are the specifics regarding Ukraine being a neutral state, and so forth and so on. Nobody could come up with a concrete answer to that. I want to be clear, the Russians do believe they're going to win this war, but exactly what winning means is not clear. Now, it's very important that I emphasize that nobody in Russia ever said to me that they envisioned conquering all of Ukraine. I find this hardly surprising. The Russians would be foolish in the extreme to try to conquer all of Ukraine because the ethnic Ukrainians in the western half of that country would make any occupation of all of Ukraine a total nightmare. So the Russians are not conquering or bent on conquering all of you Ukraine. But they are going to take a large slice of territory. And my sense, talking to people, there were a few people who said this out loud, but not many, but my sense talking to the people is that they would prefer to conquer more territory than just the four oblasts that they've annexed, which I was talking about before. I think that there are a number of Russians who would like to take Odessa and take Kharkiv and a handful of other

Oblasts as well. The Russians would like to push as far west as possible, in large part because they believe that the remaining rump state of Ukraine will be hostile to Russia.

So you see what's happening here is that the Russians understand that the Ukrainians are never going to be happy with the status quo, that is set in place after the shooting stops. The Ukrainians are going to want their territory back. They're going to those Oblasts that they lost to Russia back, and they're going to go to great lengths to try to undermine Russian control of the territory that Russia takes away from Ukraine. This incentivizes the Russians to take as much territory as possible. As much territory as is militarily feasible to conquer and politically feasible to occupy. And again, where those lines are drawn is hard to say at this point in time, but again, the Russians are incentivized to move as far west as possible, and they're incentivized to make sure that the rump Ukrainian state that remains is as dysfunctional as possible. And again, a number of Russians would say that publicly or say that to me out loud, but it was implicit in the comments of a number of other Russians that I talked to. So I think that there's no question that the settlement that the Russians envision imposing on Ukraine will be a harsh settlement for sure.

I want to make two final points. One has to do with de-Nazification. The Russians talk a lot about de-Nazifications in Ukraine. And this means eliminating the hardline, right wing, highly nationalistic Ukrainian elites from positions of power inside the Ukrainian government. I personally do not see how the Russians can do that. As I've tried to make clear here, we are going to end up with a Ukrainian rump state, and it's going to be a dysfunctional rump state. But I do not believe that the Russians will be in a position where they can determine who runs that rump state." And I think once this war is over with, the nationalists will be a powerful political force in Ukraine. And maybe I should say the ultranationalists will be a powerful political force in Ukraine. And those ultranationalists will fit the description of the Russians as Nazis. But I don't believe the Russians will be able to and I'm using the Russian rhetoric, de-Nazify Ukraine. I think the hardline nationalists will remain in power in significant ways inside of Ukraine.

And my final point is that in the West, it's widely believed that not only are the Russians interested in conquering all of Ukraine, but they're a threat to Eastern Europe, that the Russians want to basically restore the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, if they can, and that they have a well-tuned army at this point in time that they can use for that purpose. And all of this is to say that the West, especially the Europeans, are facing a significant threat from Russia. I have never believed that. And from talking to the Russians on this visit, I see no evidence, none, that they are interested in conquering any territory in Europe. As I said before, I saw no evidence, not even a hint that the Russians were interested in conquering all of Ukraine. And as I said, they would be foolish to try to do that and they would be foolish to try to invade territory in Eastern Europe or countries in Eastern Europe, which just happened to be members of NATO, which causes all sorts of obvious problems. So I think the only interesting question on the table now regarding where this war ends up is number one, how much territory do the Russians take in Ukraine? In other words, where do they stop moving westward? Number two, what is Ukraine's relationship with the West moving forward? Will

Ukraine declare its neutrality or will it continue to posture about joining NATO? But regardless of what happens on that front, I think the Russians will be incentivized to do everything they can to turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state and keep it as a that. All of this is to say that this war has been one giant disaster. And as I have said many times, the decision in early April of 2008 to expand NATO into Ukraine, to bring Ukraine into the alliance, was one of the greatest strategic blunders of modern times. That concludes what I have to say about my recent visit to Russia. Thank you all for listening, and I look forward to our next episode.

## END

---

**Thank you for reading this transcript. Please don't forget to donate to support our independent and non-profit journalism:**

| **BANKKONTO:** | **PAYPAL:** | **PATREON:** | **BETTERPLACE:** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kontoinhaber: acTVism München e.V.<br>Bank: GLS Bank<br>IBAN: DE89430609678224073600<br>BIC: GENODEM1GLS | E-Mail:<br>PayPal@acTVism.org | https://www.patreon.com/acTVism | Link: Click here |